Container Pull-preflight
Preflight one anonymously readable OCI image for a requested target platform before pull or deploy. Forest resolves the supplied tag once, selects one exact multi-arch child manifest when possible, reports that immutable manifest declared config/layer size, and checks bounded OCI referrer presence. No layers are downloaded and referrer presence is never treated as signature, SBOM, attestation or vulnerability verification.
Forest exposes this capability as a deterministic machine-readable API for software agents. Discovery is free; execution uses the canonical paid endpoint below. The live x402 challenge is the source of truth for payment terms.
Typical agent tasks
This capability is intended for bounded machine decisions such as:
- can I pull this container image on linux amd64
- check whether this docker image supports arm64 before deploy
- resolve the OCI manifest and declared size for my target platform
- check container platform size and SBOM or attestation presence before pull
- preflight a public container image before deployment
What Forest guarantees
- public anonymous OCI Distribution API only; caller cannot supply registry credentials, auth headers or arbitrary upstream URLs
- one top-level manifest resolution; multi-arch selection fetches at most one exact child manifest and one selected-digest referrers response, excluding bounded Bearer token challenge exchanges
- multi-arch selection requires exact os and architecture plus exact variant when a variant is supplied; multiple exact matches fail explicitly
- declared size is computed only from selected image-manifest config/layer descriptor sizes; config and layer blobs are never downloaded
- referrer output is bounded to 20 returned descriptors and reports presence only, never cryptographic validity or trust
- single image manifests do not prove target os/architecture without downloading config; Forest therefore returns platform_supported null and state unknown while still reporting immutable digest, declared size and referrer evidence
Boundaries
- image pullability with caller credentials, private registry access, runtime compatibility or successful deployment
- signature verification, attestation verification, SBOM validation, vulnerability scanning or supply-chain trust
- compressed transfer bytes, unpacked filesystem size, runtime memory footprint or layer blob availability
- registry state remaining unchanged after the bounded snapshot completes
Machine contract
The request and response schemas are published in the canonical OpenAPI document. This page shows a representative input from the same production manifest.
Input example
Canonical paid endpoint
Related capabilities
- Container Changed — Watch an OCI tag for digest and platform changes with a deterministic hash. Registry timestamps and unrelated annotations are ignored; no layers are pulled.
- Container Digest — Resolve a mutable OCI tag to an immutable content digest using bounded Distribution manifest metadata. It does not assert signature or vulnerability status.
- Container Platforms — Return deterministic OS/architecture variants from an OCI image index or manifest list. It reads bounded manifest metadata only and never downloads image layers.
- Container Referrers — Discover OCI 1.1 artifacts referring to an image digest, such as SBOM or attestation evidence. Presence is reported only; Forest does not verify signatures or download blobs.
- Container Size — Return registry-declared config and layer bytes for one OCI image manifest before an agent pulls it. Multi-architecture indexes require a platform-specific child digest and are rejected because their total image size is not determinate without a platform. Values are declarations, not a compressed download or vulnerability measurement.
- Container Tag-state — Check an anonymously readable OCI image tag and resolve its manifest digest through the standard Distribution API. No blob pull, push, delete or private registry access is performed.